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1. Introduction
In 2016, the turn against free trade led by US Presiden-
tial candidates Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump came
as a surprise to many US policymakers set on passing
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) during the last year of
President Obama’s presidency. Throughout 2015–2016
presidential campaign, the candidates effectively used
economic populist rhetoric to turn the TPP and past
trade agreements into equivalences with economic dis-
aster and bad political decisions. The eventual collapse
of US efforts to pass the TPP left many wondering why
the anti-trade, economic populism of candidates res-
onatedwith somanyAmericans.Whywas economic pop-
ulism so appealing to so many across the left–right polit-
ical spectrum?
This article argues that populism contains a core
story about ‘the people’ reclaiming power from ‘elites’,
and when applied to policy issues such as the TPP and
trade, can turn dry, abstract economic issues into com-
pelling narratives of betrayal, corruption, oppression
and loss. Populist narratives overcame a pro-trade, pro-
globalization, pro-TPP campaign by invoking powerful,
charged characterizations of who ‘we’ are, who is to
blame, and what the future should be, all framed in
emotional language. In examining the public messag-
ing on trade and the economy, the article finds that
the economic populist campaigns of presidential candi-
dates Bernie Sanders and Donald Trumpmore effectively
evoked feelings of a certain type of ‘we-ness’ and con-
nected better with the audience by conveying an emo-
tional expression of lack and desire for repair of some-
thing broken that sparked wide-spread resonance with
many Americans, ultimately derailing President Obama’s
plans to ratify the TPP.
Drawing insights from Ty Solomon’s (2013) work on
the resonances of neo-conservatism, the article devel-
ops a psycho-analytic, narrative framework that draws
on Lacan (1981), and applies it to selected speeches on
the economy and trade from the Obama administration
and presidential candidates Bernie Sanders and Donald
Trump during the 2015–2016 presidential campaign. Ul-
timately, the driving emotional features of resonate dis-
courses, lack and desire as articulated by Solomon’swork,
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as well as fantasy and transgression (Eberle, 2017), are
conceived here as emotional elements of story showcas-
ing the benefits of bridging a Lacanian framework with
narrative analysis and applying it to economic populism.
2. Emotions, Populism and Political Narratives
The study of emotions and affects as critical elements
of discourse and language are flourishing in the Interna-
tional Relations literature (see, for example, the recent
forum on emotions and discourse by Koschut, 2017b;
see also Bially-Mattern, 2011, 2014; Bleiker & Hutchison,
2014;Clément & Sanger, 2018; Crawford, 2000; Eberle,
2017, 2018; Fierke, 2013; Hall, 2015; Koschut, 2017a;
Solomon, 2014; Steele, 2010). More recently, scholars of
populism have also argued that the emotional appeals
of populist discourse provoke audience associations and
mobilizations (Rico, Guinjoan, & Anduiza, 2017; Salmela
& von Scheve, 2017). By turning to the study of emo-
tions and affect, scholars contend that resonance can be
better understood. In the past, scholars have sometimes
struggled to explainwhy one discourse ismore dominant
than another or why one narrativewins out over another
in a narrative clash (Solomon, 2013).
Ty Solomon (2013) argues that an explanation for
why some discourses are more appealing than others is
that some discursive constructions are infused with feel-
ings such as anxiety, fear, desire or hope that provoke
audience identification or relatability. Salmela and von
Scheve (2017) found that emotions and feelingswere cen-
tral in right-wing populist rhetoric and that policy issues
were framed in terms of emotions such as fear, anxiety,
anger and feelings of powerlessness. Minkenberg (2000)
claims that an underlying emotional content of the rad-
ical right channels a sensibility of ‘modernization losers’
where right-wing populism reflects a feeling of shrinking
social and cultural capital rather than pure victimhood. In
this sense, Salmela and von Scheve (2017) argue that the
repressed shame of loss of social, economic and cultural
stature seeks to be directed away from the self onto oth-
ers as hatred and anger at other groups. Elaborating on
this point, Jakob Eberle (2017) discusses what Lacan de-
scribes as transgression. It is an aspect of a particular type
of story—a fantasy—wherein something or someone pre-
vents the subject fromobtainingwholeness and certainty,
and not only exacerbates feelings of anxiety but actually
enjoys the process of taking something away. As Eberle
(2017) explains, the fantasy story fuels fervor by empha-
sizing the transgression “in which someone is depicted
as stealing our enjoyment by blocking our achievement
of a whole identity—and as enjoying herself in doing so”
(p. 13). As such, a discourse of populism resonates be-
cause it directs feelings of lack and shame towards blame
of others—typically elites but also scapegoats such as
immigrants, refugees and economically weak groups like
the long-term unemployed—and depicts them as taking
advantage of others, the system or “the mark” (Glynos,
Klimecki, & Willmott, 2012) and enjoying it.
In addition to analyzing how emotions affect discur-
sive resonance, some scholars of emotions show that it
is not justwhat is said, but how it is said that evokes audi-
ence association and strengthens identification with the
speaker’s position. For example, Steele conceptualizes
discursive power as a strata made up of psychological,
imaginative and rhythmic layers (2010). Rhythm helps
explain the how of power—how it is articulated in it-
erative forms (Oren & Solomon, 2015), in operational-
ized practices (Steele, 2010), and in repetition (Oren
& Solomon, 2015). Particularly in political speeches de-
signed to illicit audience emotions either in support or
opposition to an issue, iteration and repetition of cer-
tain, often ambiguous phrases, draws the audience into
the performance as producers of the political spectacle
(Edelman, 1988) that is the campaign rally, the ‘stump
speech’, the ‘roll-out’ or the ‘launch’ of a campaign. In
Oren and Solomon’s (2015) work, they argue that audi-
ence engagement in political speech in terms of chants,
and call and response repetition of simple phrases, such
as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), is productive
of a speech act and an ignored element of ‘illocutionary
force’. Indeed, Donald Trump’s campaign rallies always in-
clude an audience call and response element such as the
phrase ‘lock her up’ whenever hementioned his political
opponent. On June 27, 2018 the Daily Show even made
fun of this particular style by tweeting the following af-
ter Donald Trump’s rally in Minnesota: “Move over ‘lock
her up.’ There’s a new chant sweeping through MAGA
(Make America Great Again) country: “SPACE FORCE!”
(The Daily Show, 2018). During the Democratic National
Convention in 2016, Bernie Sanders supporters chanted
“No TPP” so loudly that several scheduled speakers, in-
cluding President Obama, had to stop and attempt to
quiet them (Arnold, 2016). To sum up, how the speech
is delivered, including the way the audience engages or
even disrupts, creates a speech experience that elevates
emotion and audience resonance for or against an issue.
In his 2013 article, Solomon developed a framework
built on Jacques Lacan (1981) to explain why the dis-
course of neoconservatism resonated with audiences
and successfully drove the Bush administration’s foreign
policy in the 2000s as opposed to the 1990s when the
ideas first circulated after the end of the Cold War. He
found that an effective discourse must spark desire, and
give voice to the subjects feeling of lack. Solomon’s
framework can provide insight into how the emotions of
populism can mobilize audiences and succeed in rallying
audiences against free trade.
Drawing on Lacan, Solomon (2013) conceptualizes
the subject as decentered and longing for a stable sense
of self. This perpetual but always unsatisfied desire for
wholeness produces affect as subjects long to be made
whole even if it is an unobtainable goal. As Solomon
states, “The subject is constituted around a lack; an al-
ways missing ‘full’ sense of self that the subject always
pursues through identification practices yet never ulti-
mately attains” (2013, p. 105). Subject identifications
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come, in part, from societal signifiers of national identity
such as ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’, ‘rights’ or other types of
collective identities proscribed in a discourse. Individu-
als see themselves as part of a collective whole and seek
identifications with symbols of this collective.
This approach helps explain why individuals relate to
seemingly abstract discourses such as neoconservatism
and populism. Both discourses are ripewith symbols that
fulfill, at least partly, a subject’s desire for identification.
It is this desire (for wholeness) that is the driving force
that connects subjects with identifications as they seek
meaning and enjoyment in pursuing fantasies that they
will someday be whole again and fulfilled. However, the
closer the subject feels to the object associated with
wholeness, the quicker desire fades. For Lacan (1981),
it is the fantasy of wholeness and the desire stimulated
by lack that offers a stabilizing discursive identity for the
subject. Thus, Solomon (2013) argues that the more a
discourse represents lack as the political state of affairs,
the more fantasies result creating greater identification
for subjects. Moreover, Eberle (2017) contends that as
a sense of lack drives desire for wholeness, it leads to
a “fantasy narrative” that envisions how that wholeness
might come about in the future or, in contrast, a “disas-
ter scenario” that might prevent wholeness from coming
to fruition (p. 6).
While Solomon (2013) refers to neoconservatism as
a discourse, his framework could be interpreted as a
narrative—a crafted and imbued story that has subjects,
objects, past and future—a sense of time that gives it
a plot. As Eberle (2017) points out, although starting
from different perspectives, there is an enriching “trad-
ing zone” between Lacanian and narrative approaches
that benefits both (p. 6). Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey
(1995) identify three elements of narrative construction:
1) a selective recounting of past events and characters,
2) the events described are temporally ordered, 3) the
events and characters are related to one another and
embedded in some overarching theme that makes up
the overall feeling or impression of the story (p. 200).
Miskimmon et al. (2013) put it this way: “A narrative
entails an initial situation or order, a problem that dis-
rupts that order, and a resolution that reestablishes or-
der….Narrative therefore is distinguished by a particular
structure through which sense is achieved” (p. 5). In this
way, populism can also be looked at as a narrative where
the core ideas of it are used in story-form to connect a
subject (the people versus the elite) theme to a problem
(free trade that destroys the middle class) and a resolu-
tion (protectionism).
However, while narrative approaches explain how
certain policies are linked to themes or ideas, and to par-
ticular subjects, they present narratives as constructing a
sequential order that helps make sense. In so doing, the
underlying affective drivers that give certain narratives
force are overlooked and it can be hard to understand
why some narratives are so powerful even when the con-
tent is ordered much the same way as other narratives.
In connecting narrative approaches with psycho-analytic
approaches to emotions, Lacan’s concepts of desire, lack
and fantasy help show what drives attachment and iden-
tification with certain narratives over others. From a La-
canian point of view, narratives feed our fundamental de-
sire to cover a lack, overcome anxiety, and our “hunger
for certainty” (Edkins, 2000, p. 154) and achieve a com-
plete and stable identity even though this is, in fact, im-
possible, making it a fantasy rather than anything actu-
ally obtainable. Eberle (2017) states that in addition to
the emotions derived from the drive to overcome lack
and push towards wholeness, fantasy narratives “are dis-
tinguished from other narratives by their excessively sim-
plified and clear-cut, ‘black and white’ character, which
leaves little room for ambiguity or uncertainty…in fan-
tasies, there are only two possible versions of the future
with no middle ground: either we recapture the ‘object’
and we are safe (the beatific scenario of securing a com-
plete identity), or we fail and we are doomed (the hor-
rific scenario of losing it)” (pp. 6–7). Thus, it’s not just se-
lective events and characters ordered in a particular se-
quence that makes a compelling story—it’s also the emo-
tion in it that does.
Combining Solomon’s Lacanian framework with a
narrative approach produces a method for analyzing
texts, such as campaign speeches. Increasingly, schol-
ars have called for more transparent methodological ap-
proaches to the study of emotions (Clément & Sanger,
2018). In line with this thinking, this article develops a
methodological framework from Solomon’s (2013) work
that articulates his theoretical insights through a narra-
tive structure. Interpreting Solomon’s (2013) work as nar-
rative elements produces the following framework: col-
lective subjects/actors, the theme or characterization of
the socio-political environment in terms of lack or whole-
ness, and how the past and the future are fantasized. This
framework is diagramed in Figure 1.
In applying this framework to the example of trade
and the TPP during the 2016 campaign, I am able to an-
alyze the different emotional resonances of the Obama
administration’s ‘trade’ narrative compared to the candi-
dates’ trade narratives, and better explain why populism
had the impact it did on the TPP debate in the US.
In the sections below, I apply the Lacanian-narrative
framework to speeches from President Obama, Bernie
Sanders and Donald Trump. The 2015–2016 period pro-
duced hundreds of press releases, media coverage, cam-
paign ads and speeches on the TPP, and I selected the
defining speeches on trade, the economy and TPP as rep-
resentative of the overall trade/TPP narrative of each
speaker. Since I was interested in understanding how
andwhy Trump and Sander’s emotional anti-TPPmessag-
ing derailed President Obama’s pro-TPP campaign, I fo-
cused on only those three speakers. While it is the case
that presidential candidateHillary Clinton also eventually
shifted her position against the TPP, she was not repre-
sentative of a populist, economic nationalist candidate
and so I did not include her in this analysis. My analysis
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Figure 1. Lacanian-narrative framework.
shows that the candidates’ narratives presentedmore at-
tractive ‘objects’, more effectively aroused desire in audi-
ences and offered retribution for transgressions of elites,
ultimately creating stronger audience identification and
resonance with their populist trade stories.
3. The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Economic
Opportunity or Economic Disaster
In 2015, the US domestic climate for trade policy looked
a lot like past free trade domestic battles, and President
Obama signaled a robust public outside-lobbying cam-
paign to convince the public and thus the Congress to
ratify TPP during his final year in office. He relied on
typical free-trade narratives that had been successful in
the past (Skonieczny, 2001, 2018) and presented the TPP
as a pro-globalization opportunity for American workers,
a regional balance against a threatening China and an
inevitable progression of the globalized economy that
would lead to a prosperous future.
However, 2016 proved to be an unusual year for US
election politics. During the 2016 presidential primary
season, Republican candidate Donald Trump and Demo-
cratic candidate Bernie Sanders (and eventually Demo-
cratic nominee Hillary Clinton) aligned against the TPP
offering a powerful, populist anti-trade message that res-
onated with an American public concerned with job loss
and American decline. The anti-trade counter-narrative
of Sanders and Trump constructed a story about free
trade as a series of economic disasters that put Americans
out of work, displaced the middle-class and benefitted
rich elites and pro-business corporations, and this rallied
NGOs, labor unions and others opposed to trade policies.
3.1. President Obama: Trade as Hope; TPP as a Balance
against China
This section analyzes President Obama’s pro-TPP nar-
rative through the Lacanian-narrative framework dis-
cussed above. In particular, it focuses on one main
speech given by President Obama on May 8, 2015, at
theNike headquarters in Beaverton, Oregon shortly after
Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton had announced their
candidacies for president but before Donald Trump’s
announcement. The speech, titled “Remarks on Trade”,
took place just prior to the ‘fast-track’ authority vote in
Congress and was no doubt aimed at shoring up support
for his trade legislation agenda which primarily included
the TPP.
In it, Obama constructs a specific collective subject,
the small business owner or entrepreneur, he character-
izes the socio-political environmentmore towardswhole-
ness over lack, and emphasizes a hopeful and optimistic
American (fantasized) future (see Figure 2).
There are several striking features of the speech
that showcase the overall pro-TPP messaging produced
by the White House. The speech took place at Nike
Headquarters—this choice of location and backdrop as
well as choice of audience (Nike workers) projected a
certain aesthetic power (Steele, 2010) and resonance
that favored the primary subjects of Obama’s speech—
entrepreneurs and small businesses—and the unstated
subject—corporations—arguably the subjects with the
most to gain from the TPP free trade agreement. The
choice of backdrop displays confidence in a ‘winning’
trade message that combined pro-globalization argu-
ments with an anti-China, us/them character clash in-
dicative of past trade victories (Skonieczny, 2018). It com-
bines well with Obama’s characterization of the socio-
political environment as full of opportunity (rather than
lack) and his optimistic, hopeful fantasy of the future
as one where American entrepreneurs innovate, lead
through technological development and set the stan-
dards for the rest of the world. Because the speech
took place before the candidates’ Sanders and Trump
really began their campaigns in earnest, Obama’s TPP
narrative stands out as one not yet exposed to the pop-
ulist surge that was just around the corner. However,
even a full year later, Obama continued to push his TPP
narrative primarily to business groups even as (or per-
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Figure 2. Obama’s trade narrative.
haps because) he encountered increased resistance at
home as the presidential election heated up and anti-
TPP sentiment grew. For example, in June 2016, Presi-
dent Obama continued his push for TPP to business audi-
ences gathered by a federally-sponsored business group,
SelectUSA: “This is not just about jobs and trade, it’s not
just about hard cold cash. It’s also about building rela-
tionships across borders. When your companies come
together, you help bring countries and cultures together”
(Miller, 2016). Again, themain characters in Obama’s TPP
narrative continued to be businesses, building elite rela-
tionships with other businesses in foreign cultures. This
particular type of ‘trade story’ unintentionally fueled an
opposition built on populist sentiment that character-
ized the middle class environment as one filled with lack
and exploitation from corporate elites who benefitted at
their expense.
3.2. The Candidates’ TPP Narrative: Populism, Despair,
Transgression and a Scapegoat
In contrast to President Obama, Trump and Sanders
trade narratives focused primarily on the exploitative re-
lationship between subjects in a populist story of cor-
rupt/corporate elites vs. the everyday people/worker.
The power of the populism storyline in their anti-trade
narrative came, in part, from tactical use of emotional
language that emphasized a lack created by workers be-
ing ‘left behind’ by globalization and by ‘others’ taking
something away whether China, Mexico, corporations,
‘the elite’ or immigrants. For example, at a speech at a
United Steelworkers rally in Indiana, Sanders stated:
Wemust rewrite our disastrous trade policies that en-
able corporate America to shut down plants in this
country and move to Mexico and other low-wage
countries. We need to end the race to the bottom
and enact trade policies that demand that Ameri-
can corporations create jobs here and not abroad.
(Sanders, 2016)
In this segment, Sanders signals that ‘corporate America’
is the responsible party who ‘prevents wholeness’ and
causes a painful lack of progress for theworking class sug-
gesting a corporate ‘transgression’ profiting off of this ac-
tion at the expenseof the ‘little guy’. As Eberle (2017) sug-
gests certain narratives provide more attractive ‘objects’
of desire (e.g.: factory jobs) promised by fantasy futures
that present the situation in notably ‘black and white’
terms (disastrous trade agreements caused by past ac-
tions of politicians corrupted by corporate elites) as fix-
able by future courses of action (Sanders’ and Trump’s
economic plans of retreating from free trade and bring-
ing jobs back). Moreover, Sanders and Trump enact col-
lective identities thatwere favorable to awidermargin of
American society such as the ‘working people’ or ‘middle
class’. In fact, in 2017, 62%of Americans self-identified as
middle class (Newport, 2017).
In a similar narrative construction, one month ear-
lier, Trump wrote an Op/Ed in USA Today against the TPP.
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He wrote:
The great American middle class is disappearing.
One of the factors driving this economic devasta-
tion is America’s disastrous trade policies.…America’s
politicians—beholden to global corporate interests
who profit from offshoring—have enabled jobs theft
in every imaginable way. They have tolerated for-
eign trade cheating while enacting trade deals that
encourage companies to shift production overseas.
(Trump, 2016a)
Like Sanders, Trump emphasizes a corporate transgres-
sion that looked the other way while foreign countries
(unspoken China) stole (wholeness) from the working
people in America. The orientation of the candidates’
narratives towards lack (stolen wholeness), corporate
transgression and exploitation, and thus a fantasy future
of change towards a new approach to trade, or repeated
disasters if the candidates’ vision is rejected, is almost
diametrically opposed to Obama’s trade story and thus,
made the choice abundantly black and white.
In Figures 3 and 4 below, Sanders’ campaign an-
nouncement speech in Burlington, Vermont, on May 26,
2015, and Donald Trump’s speech on trade in Monessen,
Pennsylvania, on June 28, 2016, are diagramed to show
how the Lacanian-narrative framework applies to the
two speeches.
As diagrammed in Figure 3, Sanders’ announcement
speech emphasizes a collective subject, the American
people and workers, who have been shut out of politics
and exposed to the greatest wealth inequality of Amer-
ica’s history. Sanders’ presents a socio-political environ-
ment gone very wrong and in need of a people’s revolu-
tion to get America back on track. He suggests a scape-
goat (lobbyists and super PACs) and contrasts his collec-
tive subject with the billionaires who benefit most from
the current system (and are pretty happy about it), which
just further exacerbates the transgression and thus, au-
dience desire for an object that rights the wrongs.
In Figure 4, Trump’s speech is diagrammed. It shows
the many similarities to Sanders’ in terms of how they
construct a common collective subject, position oppo-
sites and characterize the current socio-political environ-
ment. Trump’s speech is specifically about trade and the
economy and directly addresses the TPP. It similarly sets
up a common, populist storyline of workers versus pow-
erful corporations and financial elites. It also character-
izes the current socio-political environment as one of ex-
treme lack deliberately caused by politicians and their
bad trade deals. He harkens back to a past where the
economy thrived due to a robust industrial, producerist
economy and calls for an ‘America first’ future that only
he can ultimately create. Of all the speeches, Trump’s
stands out for his prolific use of emotional trigger words
and extreme characterizations.
The next sections break-down the narrative seg-
ments (characters/subjects, theme/characterization of
the environment, and fantasies of the past/future) to fur-
ther compare the different ways Obama and the candi-
dates construct their TPP/Trade narratives.
4. Elements of Opposing Trade Narratives
4.1. Collective Subjects
In contrast to the candidates’ narratives where the
‘worker’ is the collective subject, Obama bases his col-
lective subject on the small business owner and the
entrepreneur. He contrasts small business owners with
the big corporations typically associated with benefitting
from free trade agreements. For example, he states early
Figure 3. Bernie Sanders trade/TPP Narrative.
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Figure 4. Donald Trump’s trade narrative.
on his speech on trade at Nike:
Small businesses are the backbone of our econ-
omy….They employ millions of people, 98 percent of
exporters are small businesses…they represent some-
thing essential about this country—the notion that
if you’ve got a good idea and you’re willing to work
at it, you can turn that idea into a business, you can
grow that business, and…you can give other people
a chance to earn a living even as you do well. That’s
America’s promise. And it’s up to us to keep that
promise alive. (Obama, 2015)
In this segment, President Obama connects the small
business owner to an American identity that is often acti-
vated in trade campaigns. The classic promise of America
or the American Dream is that everyone can be suc-
cessful through hard work and ingenuity. But here, he
evokes the American Dream storyline by placing small
businesses as a subject who can help fulfill this American
Dream promise.
In contrast, Sanders’ and Trump’s speeches estab-
lish the collective subjects in populist terms as ‘workers’
and the ‘people’. Sanders characterizes ‘the people’ as
change agents responsible for leading a revolution that
will take back the government and the country from bil-
lionaires. He states:
Today, we stand here and say loudly and clearly that
enough is enough. This great nation and its govern-
ment belong to all of the people, and not to a hand-
ful of billionaires, their Super-PACs and their lobbyists.
(Sanders, 2015)
Trump also constructs a collective subject of ‘workers’ in
opposition to ‘politicians’ and ‘financial elites’. Thus, at
the outset of their speeches, Sanders and Trump similarly
draw on populism to signal identification to the audience
and also to positionwho is to blame for current, poor con-
ditions of the American economy.
4.1.1. Scapegoat and Transgression
Also in the beginning of both speeches, Sanders and
Trump blame at least one scapegoat for causing the
current and past situation. Sanders clearly identifies
who is to blame for disastrous trade policies and the
economic hardship of middle-class Americans—the ex-
tremely greedy billionaire class and politicians who have
supported free trade deals in the past. He states: “for
decades, presidents from both parties have supported
trade agreements which have cost us millions of de-
cent paying jobs as corporate America shuts down plants
here and moves to low-wage countries” (Sanders, 2015).
Trump also immediately identifies a specific target of
blame. He states:
Our workers’ loyalty was repaid…with total betrayal.
Our politicians have aggressively pursued a policy of
globalization, moving our jobs, our wealth and our
factories to Mexico and overseas. Globalization has
made the financial elite, who donate to politicians,
very, very wealthy. (Trump, 2016b)
In Trump’s speech, he also raises China as a target of
blame particularly in his direct references to the TPP.
He states:
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is the greatest dan-
ger yet. The TPP, as it is known, would be the
death blow for American manufacturing….It would
further open our markets to aggressive currency
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cheaters—cheaters, that’s what they are, cheaters.
(Trump, 2016b)
By raising the issue of ‘currency cheaters’ in reference
to the TPP, he associates trade disasters with one of his
favorite scapegoats—China. By positioning the subject,
China, in opposition to American identity, Trump con-
structs a well-known ‘other’ to the US self. He is able to
contrast China to America—as a rule-breaker (cheater)
and as an antithesis to American values. China is corrupt,
America follows laws. China is a cheater, America plays
on a level playing field.
President Obama also positions China as the distinct
other in his story. Obama uses China as an opposite to
the US but primarily by suggesting that if the US does not
take a leadership role in Asia, China will—and in subse-
quent speeches he spells out that China is already work-
ing on a parallel trade agreement that mirrors the TPP
but without many of the labor and environmental pro-
tections included. For example, he states:
Some folks think we should just withdraw and not
even try to engage in trade with these countries. I dis-
agree.We have tomake sure America writes the rules
of the global economy. And we should do it today,
while our economy is in the position of global strength.
Because if we don’t write the rules for trade around
the world—guess what—China will. (Obama, 2015)
While he implies that Chinese leadership in Asia and in
trade is not a good thing, he avoids describing China’s
actions as a transgression against American workers
(cheaters) and thus does not inspire audience desire for
retribution against China in the way that Trump does. In-
deed, China’s rise is triggered by America’s retreat and
thus the blame falls on US actions, not China’s. Thus,
even Obama’s attempt at blame fails to land squarely on
an identifiable scapegoat.
On the other hand, Sanders and Trump are prolific in
their use of emotional triggerwords such as ‘disaster’, ‘be-
trayal’, ‘greed’, and urgency such as ‘enough is enough’.
By establishing a target of blame, they are able to direct
the audience to a specific transgression of an ‘other’ re-
sponsible for stealing certainty and safety from the work-
ing class, and personally benefiting and even ‘tricking’ the
working class out of its piece of the American pie. This cre-
ates an association of ‘we-ness’ from a much broader au-
dience who can readily associate with a ‘worker’ or ‘peo-
ple’ identity in contrast to a billionaire or corrupt politi-
cian. This approach was far more effective than Obama’s
construction of a ‘small business owner’ collective sub-
ject without a clear scapegoat or target of responsibility.
4.2. Characterization of the Socio-Political Environment
All narratives have a theme and in the TPP narratives,
the theme relates to how the speakers characterize the
socio-political environment relating to the economy. For,
Obama, his trade story characterizes the socio-political
economic environment as robust, full of hope and thriv-
ing and thus closer to wholeness as opposed to lack. In-
deed, President Obama references a past lack—the col-
lapse of the US economy and the recession—that has
been overcome by the hard work of small business en-
trepreneurs. He states:
[America’s] promise was threatened for almost ev-
erybody just about seven years ago, when the econ-
omy nearly collapsed, and millions of Americans lost
their jobs and their homes and their life savings. But
thanks to the hard work of the American people
and entrepreneurs…we’re in a different place today.
(Obama, 2015)
Here the credit for overcoming lack goes primarily to his
constructed collective subject—entrepreneurs. While he
vaguely references the American people, he immediately
specifies he means entrepreneurs, the collective subject
he emphasizes throughout the speech. He goes on:
So small businesses deserve a lot of credit. In fact,
over the past several years, small businesses have cre-
ated nearly two out of three new American jobs. And
the question is, how do we build on success? We’ve
got to be relentless in our efforts to support small busi-
nesses who are creating jobs and helping to grow the
economy. (Obama, 2015)
This trade narrative positions a narrow and specific col-
lective subject as pushing a thriving economy towards
more American jobs and success in the future. As such,
Obama’s trade narrative fails to activate subject identifi-
cation because his subject is narrow and onemost Amer-
icans cannot relate to, and his environment characteriza-
tion is more towards wholeness thus not sparking much
desire on the part of the audience for change or fantasy.
In contrast, Sanders and Trump use their speeches
to establish an assessment of the socio-political environ-
ment as eviscerated by bad past trade deals that have
fundamentally transformed the American heartland and
factory-working class. They continue to signal despair
and lack, and then to inspire a fantasy of the future that
can only come if either one of them is elected as the
next president. For example, Sanders states that his cam-
paign is going to send a message to the billionaire class
that their “greed has got to end” (Sanders, 2015) and
that under his leadership “trade policies will break that
cycle of agreements which enrich at the expense of the
working people of this country” (Sanders, 2015). Accord-
ing to Trump, globalization and the policies of the finan-
cial elite have left “millions of our workers with nothing
but poverty and heartache”, “jobs have vanished and our
communities were plunged into Depression-level unem-
ployment” (Trump, 2016b). Trump continues to establish
lack and blame through a populist narrative, “our politi-
cians took away from the people their means of mak-
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ing a living and supporting their families. Skilled crafts-
men and tradespeople and factory workers have seen
the jobs they love shipped thousands and thousands of
miles away” and “towns are in a state of total disrepair”.
“Globalization has wiped out totally, totally, our middle
class” (Trump, 2016b). The socio-economic environment
is characterized as filled with despair, disrepair and eco-
nomic devastation.
4.3. Past and Future (Fantasy)
Narratives are also distinguished by temporality or a
sense of past and future. In Lacanian terms, temporality
is a fantasy of what can come about in the future to bring
about either wholeness and repair of a nightmare sce-
nario of despair (Eberle, 2017). The past is also fantasized
as it is selectively recalled to serve the overall purpose
of the narrative theme. In Obama’s trade narrative, he
presents two futures of globalization—one where Amer-
ica is in charge and taking a leadership role (the beatific
scenario of securing a complete identity), and onewhere
the US takes a back seat to less-worthy leaders such as
China (the nightmare scenario). For example, he states:
We can’t stand on the beaches and stop the global
economy at our shores.We’ve got to harness it on our
terms. This century is built for us. It’s about innovation.
It’s about dynamism and flexibility and entrepreneur-
ship, and information and knowledge and science and
research. That’s us. (Obama, 2015)
This segment solidifies his trade/pro-TPP narrative—it
positions an entrepreneurial collective subject that is
able andwilling to lead in new areas of economic growth.
For Sanders and Trump, the solution for past disas-
trous trade and economic policies comes with a fanta-
sized economic futurewhere the American dream can be
restored to small factory towns in middle America. They
both signal the American dream that has been forgotten
but can be restored. Sanders states it as such:
I have seen the promise of America in my own life.
My parents would have never dreamed that their son
would be a US Senator, let alone run for president. But
for too many of our fellow Americans, the dream of
progress and opportunity is being denied by the grind
of an economy that funnels all the wealth to the top.
(Sanders, 2015)
For Trump, he also references a fantasized future of the
American dream, he states: “you have a great future
folks…I want you to imagine a much better life and a
life where you can believe in the American dream again.
Right now, you can’t do that” (Trump, 2016b). In Sanders’
and Trump’s speeches, they reference a fantasized future
that can restore a working-class American dream that re-
turns factory jobs back to middle American by restoring
‘America first’ economic policies.
Sanders and Trump represent the past as both an
example of bad choices by others (bad trade policies)
and as an economic time before bad choices that can
be reclaimed again. They seek to recapture something
pure that was part of the American dream—whether it
is governance by the people, or good, honest middle-
class factory jobs that have been taken away by greedy
elites. Trump’s campaign slogan “Make America Great
Again” suggests that Trump’s platform is entirely focused
on reclaiming what has been lost. Solomon (2013) sug-
gests that an emphasis on lack (or what is missing)
“drives desire for reclaiming that which has been lost”
(p. 116) and that this conjuring of lack creates an ef-
fective and resonate discourse. In narrative terms, the
type of subjects and the plot of overcoming a lack that
is apparent in Sanders’ and Trump’s economic narratives
explain, at least in part, what gave their trade stories
more resonance.
Moreover, the candidates’ narratives turned some-
thing rather unknown like the TPP, into an emotional
story of betrayal, subversion, and conspiracy against
the people. Sanders and Trump regularly deployed emo-
tional trigger words and ‘colorful’ language to denounce
free trade and the TPP. Indeed, in past and subsequent
speeches and comments about US trade policy, Trump
used the word ‘rape’ to describe bad trade deals. For
example, he stated, “the Trans-Pacific Partnership is an-
other disaster done and pushed by special interests who
want to rape our country—just a continuing rape of our
country” (Lima, 2016). Sanders’ and especially Trump’s
use of emotional trigger words in association with trade
helped elevate the issue’s urgency and connect a policy
issue that is often abstract with a visceral image of phys-
ical violation.
In contrast, Obama’s trade narrative fails to appeal
to three central features of resonance—a collective sub-
ject that inspires identification, a construction of an envi-
ronment of lack that then sparks desire and affect in the
audience for wholeness or at least a fantasy of whole-
ness, a sense of past that either inspires a harkening or
something to overcome. It also lacks a fourth element
that is a central part of the candidates’ narrative, a trans-
gression executed by a villain or a scapegoat. Moreover,
Obama’s speech was light on emotional trigger words
and instead relied on a more typical narrative strategy
that had worked in the past—constructing a positive
American identity that is successful in the future and po-
sitioning trade as an extension of the American Dream
and a crucial part of an inevitable globalization that can
lead to success for the American middle class.
5. Conclusions
The article compares President Obama’s and US presi-
dential candidates Sanders’ and Trump’s TPP/trade nar-
ratives to provide an explanation for why populism res-
onated on both the political right and political left and up-
ended President Obama’s efforts to ratify the TPP during
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his final year. It finds that Sanders and Trump were more
effective at constructing broader, more appealing collec-
tive subjects within an emotional, populist story of peo-
ple versus elites to target free trade. In contrast, Obama’s
collective subjects, small business owners, evoked little
desire for identification because small business owners
and entrepreneurs were already successful in economic
sectors such as technology, services and information. His
narrative also failed to resonate because it focused too
closely on American wholeness and success and painted
a picture of a thriving American economy that failed to
inspire a fantasy of change and was disassociated from
the broader American experience.
Moreover, Sanders and Trump were more successful
at constructing emotional narratives of lack, economic
betrayal and despair. They painted a picture of a by-
gone America eviscerated by bad trade deals signed by
financial elites who benefited at the expense of every-
one else. They used emotional trigger words directed at
easily accepted scapegoats to inspire audiences to con-
nect their personal losses to abstract, complicated trade
agreements, and promised economic revival and whole-
ness in the future. By evoking audience desire for re-
claiming something lost, Sanders and Trump succeed in
dominating the public debate on trade and sidelining the
TPP, and ultimately prevented President Obama from
bringing the TPP legislation to Congress for a vote. Once
elected, President Trump ‘unsigned’ the TPP on his first
working day in office fulfilling one of his most commonly
stated campaign promises.
The article contributes to the rapidly growing liter-
ature on populism and emotions. While there is an ex-
plosion of explanations for why populism is gaining trac-
tion worldwide, few analyses thus far have closely ex-
amined the emotional language of elites regarding trade
and economic policy for insights into how and why eco-
nomic populism is proliferating. The article argues that
trade policy must be constructed as something that audi-
ences can relate to in order to gain enough support, and
consequentially, trade stories present an opportunity for
understanding the relationship between narratives, emo-
tions and foreign policy.
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